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INTRODUCTION
The field of international relations has seen a tremendous
increase in the study and research of international crises.

The

interest in these situations has increased the study of decisionmaking and the process through which decisions are made.

The

importance of a crisis can increase with its propensity in
escalating into something much more serious than the initial event.
Thus the process by which it is handled is extremely important.
The objectives that a state wants to produce will determine the
way an international crisis is defined or handled and the process
by which it is dealt with.

Thus understanding the decision-

making process of the crisis will establish the objectives in the
course of action taken and policy followed (Sullivan 1976).

For

example, under what circumstances will it be possible to solve
the crisis through a diplomatic solution and when will military
measures have to be initiated to maintain the state's
objectives?
In the theory of Groupthink, its main proponent, Irving Janis
(1982), maintains that in certain decision-making situations there
are identifiable characteristics that a group reflects.
situations that exhibit a measure of

hi~h

accompanying concurrence-seeking tendency.

These are

cohesiveness and an
These characteristics,

in turn, will affect the critical thinking of a group.

Janis
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stated that there was i n i mperfect link between groupthink and
crises he termed as fiasc oes:
Si mply because the outcome of a group decision has turne-0
out to be a fiasco, I do not assu me that it must have been
the result of groupth i nk or even that it was the result of
defective decision -mak ing. Nor do I expect that every
defective decision , whether arising from groupthink or
from other causes, will produce a fiasco . . . but . . .
Over and beyond all the fam iliar sources of human error
is a powerful source of defective judgment that arises
in cohesive groups - th e concurrence-seeking tendency,
which fosters over - opt i mism , lack of vigilance, and
sloganistic thinking about the weakness and immorality
of out-groups . (Janis 1982)
Janis postulates that there are antecedent circumstances concerning
a decision-making group that wi ll determine its cohesiveness and
concurrence - seeking .

The se preceding conditions consist of internal

and external stresses that ca n po tentially produce concurrenceseeking and lead to the de velopment of the eight symptoms of
groupthink .

The inte r na l stimuli is the preceding structure of

the group and the re l at ionship of individuals involved:

the

external st i muli i s t he environmental context or situation the
group is in wh i le mak ing decisions.
Groupthi nk symp t oms consist of group products and processes
that re i nforce eac h other.
catego ri es :

Janis places them in three

press ures toward uniformity, closed- mindedness,

and t he over- est i ma tion of the group's power and morality.
The pressures toward a group consensus, which eliminates
in divi dua l person al arguments in group decision making; (b} a
shared illusion of unanimity concerning judgments conforming to
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the majority view; (c ) pressure applied by the group to those
few members who showed signs of deviating from the consensus;
(d) self-appointed mindguards who protect the group from adverse
information.

Close -mindedness involves (e) the incomplete

analysis of policy implications and (f) stereotyping the enemy
as inferior for decision-making purposes.

The third category

is essentially a product of the other two and involves the
overestimation of the group's power and morality.
(g) a

shar~d

This produces

belief by the group that it was invulnerable, which

encourages risk taking from a feeling of excessive optimism, and
(h) the unquestioned belief in the group's inherent morality in
its decision -making .
When a group takes on a majority of these characteristics,
the production of poor decision-making will be the result of the
group's dominance for concurrence-seeking.

As Jeanne Longley and

Dean Pruitt (1980) point out; if groupthink is to maintain a
purely negative connotation, it needs to be defined as "premature
concurrence-seeking," since early concurrence-seeking is seen as
appropriate for rapid integration of ideas into a solution.
If concurrence-seeking does produce defective decisionmaking, it runs the risk that consequences produced from these
symptoms will be displayed.
survey

These include:

{l) the inadequ-0te

of the full range of policy alternatives; (2) the

incomplete survey of objectives that might be affected by the
chosen policy; (3) the failure to examine risks of initial
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preferred choice for nono bv i ous connotations; (4) the failure
to exqmine the risks, i ncl uding the benefits and cost of all
alternatives; (5) the fa ilure to obtain expert information
concerning the costs and bene f its of all alternatives; (6) the
selected bias in processing information that does not support
the initially preferred sol ution; and (7) the improper analysis
for contingency plans that mi ght be produced from a S€tback in
the event that known risks mater i alize (see Appendix 1).
The purpose of this thes i s is to examine if elements of
groupthink were present in t he decision-making group of the
Ford Administration dur i ng t he event of the May 1975 Mayaguez
and extend analysis on the relationship of the ant€cedent
conditions infl uenc i ng the decision-making group.

The Mayaguez

incident involved the se i zure of the American merchant ship by
Cambodian armed force s on the pretense that it was on a spying
mission .

The Unite d States responded initially with diplomatic

measures t hen quic kly moved with an armed force attack to recapture
the ship and its cr ew.

The subjects of this analysis are the

preside nt and the National Security Council with whom the
pres i dent cons ul te d conc erning the U.S. response.
The Ford Administration immediately categorized the
military operation as a success.

The media took this lead in

its news coverage placing emphasis on this

11

gutsy move.
11

In re trospect students of decision-making are debating whether
the Mayaguez incident was actually a success or failure in
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foreign policy decision-making.

The cost in human life was

expen?ive, but the national interest concerning our determination
in Southeast Asia was seen as important to administration
officials after the collapse of allied governments in South
Vietnam and Cambodia .

The irony of the incident was that

shortly after the United States launched the attack, the
Cambodian government had announced that they were going to
release the ship and crew .
Though the Mayaguez incident was publicized as being a
military success, analysts agree (Janis 1982) that this incident
showed elements of poor decision-making.

The focus of this

research is a belief that an understanding of the external
stress effe-cting the decision-makers plays a key role in the
situational context.

Thus analyzing the situational context

is necessary in evaluating the relationship of the antecedent
conditions in terms of the development of concurrence-seeking
leading to groupthink.

To reiterate, Janis stated:

I use the term 11 groupthink 11 as a quick and easy way
to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage
in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive ingroup, when the members• striving for unanimity
override their motivation to realistically appraise
alternative courses of action . . . and refers to a
deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing,
and moral judgment that results from in-group
press ures. (Janis, 1982)
In today's w-0rld

her~

foreign policy decisions can P.rod4ce

irreversible ramificat ions it is important to reduce any
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error in judgment.

It is my opinion that understanding the

development of concurrence-seeking through the antecedent
conditions of groupthink and reducing these elements would
produce a conscious effort toward quality decision-making.
Literature Review
There are basic inconsistencies in the literature dealing
with crises and the decision-making process that surround them.
When a nation-state is faced with a crisis situation its policymakers decide on the goals to be achieved, according to valued
national interests, for the response of the decision-making
process. By defining the "national interest" of a nation-state
it forces politicians to be more exact in their actions and
produces a clearer perspect ive of what objectives have to be
met.

Donald Nuechterlein (1979) has proposed a conceptual

framework for defining national interest and divides this into
four basic interests of nation-states:

defense, economic, world-

order, and ideological.
Using these divisions Nuechterlein defines national interest
as the perceived needs and desires of a sovereign state in
relation to other sovereign states which constitute its
ext~rnal

1.

en vironment.

These divisions are:

Defense interests: the protection of t~e nationstate and its citizens from the threat of physical
violence by another country, and/or protection
from an externally inspired threat to the national
political system.
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2.

Eco nomic i nterest : the enhancement of the
nation - state s ec onomic well-being in relation
with other states .
1

3.

World -order in t erest: the maintenance of an
international polit i cal and economic system in
which the nation - state can feel secure and in
which its citizens and commerce can operate
peacefully outside t he ir own borders.

4.

Ideological interest : the protections and
furtherance of a set of values which the
citizens of a nation - state share and believe
to be universally good . (Nuechterlein 1979)

It is Nuechterlein s contention that the four basic national interests
1

outlined above will provide the substance required in describing the
objectives of nation - states i n the international system.

This is the

desired goal in using the t e rm "national interest" and also to
provide the individual with some form of ability to predict a
state ' s behavior dur i ng a cr i s is situation.

This conceptual

framework that Nuechterle i n ha s proposed is only a definition;
the interpretat i on by pol i t ical decision-makers for the nationstate and its peop l e wi ll determine the interests that are most
important at a specif i c t i me to produce a response reaction.
This will then legit i mi ze a state's reaction through its
interpretat i on of des ired goals.
In dea lin g wi th the process of operationalizing a crisis
s i t uat ion James Robinson proposed a three- f old concept of crisis
based on a number of case studies.

This preliminary chara-eteriz,ation

of cri s i s included identi f ication of the origin of the event
(whether external or internal f-0r decision-makers); time
available f or response (short, intermediate, or long); and
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relat iv e impo r tance t o pa rticipants of the values at state (low
or high) (Robinson 1972) .
Charles Herma nn' s definition was derived from Robinson's
conception of internat i onal cr isis as a decisional situation.
It states:
A crisis is a situation tha t (1) threatens high-priority
goals of the decis i on -mak i ng unit, (2) restricts the
amount of time availab l e fo r response before the
decision is transformed , and (3) surprises the
members of the decision -mak i ng unit by its occurrence
. . . Underlying the proposed de f inition is the
hypothesis that if al l three traits are present then
the decision process wil l be substantially different
than if only one or two of t he characteristics appear.
(Brecher 1979)
This definition can become very complex even though it contains
only three components .

For examp le t he ti me response can

differ due to the nature of a si t uation, where the response time
for one crisis would be tota l ly inadequate for another.

Also

the time variable wil l di ffer depending on the person or
persons making the decision.

This is caused by the personal

characteristics of a person or a group.

Directly rela te d to this

is the perceived threat to goals which was def ined as Nuechterlein's
conceptual framework of "na tional interest."
Mi chae l Brecher builds on Hermann ' s def in it ion but differs
on f ou r esse nt i al poin t s:

t he omissio n of

11

su r prise 11 as a

nece ss ary condition; the addition of p€ rc e ived "high probability
of involv eme nt in military ho s tilities"; t he replacement of
short time by

11

f inite 11 time for response; and the recognition
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that the situational change which induces a crisis may originate
in the internal as well as the external environment of the crisis
action.

Brecher's interpretation states a crisis as being:
(1) a change in the state's external or internal
environment which generates (2) a threat to
basic values, with a simultaneous or subsequent
(3) high probability of involvement in military
hostilities, and the awareness of (4) a finite
time for their response to the external value
threat. (Brecher 1977)

This definition emphasized the fact that the crisis actor will be
responding to the behavior of other actors in the international
system during crisis decisions thus the concentration is not on
the perception and behavior of a single state.
With these two definitions in mind, Leo Hazlewood, John
Hayes, and James Brownall, Jr. (1977) state, with differing
definitions, that three distinct orientations toward identifying
a crisis exist.

First, crises have been defined from a decision-

making perspective in studies that probed the behavior of
individuals and decision-making groups.

(This is the basis

for Irving Janis' groupthink analysis.)

The second perspective

included observed changes in the rate of interaction between
countries at specific time periods.

The third perspective

contains an important and lasting interuption to the patterns
and relationships in the international system.

Thus, here a

"crisis" is seen as a change in the international system
(Hazlewood, Hayes, Browne 11 1977).
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The basis of this analysis is what Janis called the
''groupthink" phenomenon.

Janis's first study examining this

phenomena involved the analysis of several foreign policy
decisions of the American government.

He argued that intense

social pressures toward uniformity and in-group loyalty within
decision-making groups can build to the point where they
seriously interfere with both cognitive efficiency and moral
judgment.

Groupthink occurs when independent critical analysis

of the problem facing the group assumes second place to group
members' motivation to maintain the group's solidarity and to
avoid creating disunity by expressing unpopular doubts or
opinions.
In several case studies of major foreign policy decisions by
the American government, Janis attempted to trace the effects
of social pressures toward groupthink on decision-making.

He

selected for analysis cases in which he felt the signs of poor
decision-making resulted from concurrence-seeking.

Janis

hypothesized that if certain administrative or structural
conditions were present it would facilitate the occurrence of
groupthink during a decision-making situation through the
psychological structural faults of the group.
The structural faults which Janis believed facilitate
groupthink are (1) the cohesiveness of the decision-making
group, which would include the relative importance of belonging
to the group and the desire to remain a member of it {thi s
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implies working together over an extended and continuing basis),
(2) the insulation of the group, which does not allow for expert
advice from outside th e gro up; (3) the lack of an impartial
leadership, thus using power an d in fl uence to alter the
decision -making process of the group; and (4) lack of norms
requiring methodical procedure s for dealing with the decisionmaking tasks.
Matie Flowers (1977) did a study concerning two critical
variables that were included i n Janis' hypothesis.

It

involved an experiment to test group cohesiveness and leadership
style as independent variab l es t hat are involved in the
decision -making process of groups.

Flowers used 120 undergraduate

students in a laboratory experiment to test Janis' hypothesis.
In the experiment 32 upperc lassmen were trained by Flowers and
used as group leaders and instructed to conduct meetings
according to two l ea ders hip styles:
1.

Open style - In line with prescriptive hypotheses
about preve nt i ng groupthink.

(a) The leader did

not state his own suggested solution until all other
members had t he opportunity to offer their preferred
solution s .

(b) The leader asked for and encouraged

discussion of each suggested course of action.
(c ) The leader stated at the beginning and again
about 10-15 minutes into the discussion that the
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most i mporta nt t hing was to air all possible
viewpoints to reach a wise decision.
2.

Closed sty l e - (a) The leader stated his own
preferred solution at the beginning.

(b) The

leader stated at t he beginning and repeated
after 10- 15 minutes t hat the most important
thing was for the team t o agree on its
decision.
Flowers' findings showed t hat leadership style was the most
important variable in the expe ri ment.
both high- and low-cohesive grou ps.

Groupthink appeared in

It is a characteristic of

Janis' work that cohesive ness in the group is a prerequisite
of groupthink.

Fl owers adm itted that the operati6nalization

of cohesiveness for the exper imental groups was quite different
from those of dec i sion -mak in g groups in foreign policy.
It is not cl ear in Flowers' experiment whether the group
leaders have the ability to alter the decision-making process.
In foreign pol i cy groups t his legitimated power has been
established over a long -standing relationship and individual
persona l it i es ha ve in f lu enced the process of group norms that
have evolved or initi ally taken place.

Flowers stated that

Jani s ' t heory might need to be revised where the level of
cohe siveness was a critical independe nt variable, but Tetlock
(19 79 ) said that it was impossible to take such a step when
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there was such ambiguity present in the operationalization
of a fundamental aspect of the study.
What was significant in Flowers' findings was that the
difference in leadership style produced a difference in the
number of proposed solutions .

The closed leadership style

produced fewer proposed solution s and fewer facts introduced
in the discussion than the open leadership style.

This follows

logically since the leader initially proposed the preferred
solution and discouraged the discuss ion of other suggested
solutions.
Tetlock's own study applied standard content analysis
procedures to statements of key decision makers involved
in the groupthink and nongroupthink crises Janis examined.
Tetlock stated that the similarity here was significant because
of the two different ways the data was processed (public
statements versus the retrospective accounts of observers and
participants) .

His content analysis consisted of techniques

to assess the quality of thinking in public speeches made by
the president of the United States and the secretary of state.
Tetlock's findings showed that when elements of groupthink were
present the co ntent of their public speeches involved in these
s i t uations we1e seen as simplistic and showed significantly
lower scores of cognitive complexity than for the nongroupthink
decisions.
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Longley and Pruit t ( 1980) critiqued Janis' theory and
suggested that the def i ni ti on of "groupthink as concurrence11

seeking produced a pure ly negative interpretation.

It was their

opinion that in routine probl em-solving situations, early
concurrence - seeking in the sense of rapid integration of ideas
into a solution is proba bly quite appropriate.

Thus a negative

meaning of groupthink requ ires the definition of "premature
concurrence - seeking•• (Long l ey and Pruitt 1980).
Janis

1

rebuttal to thi s arg ument was that the circumstances

involved around groupthink -dom inated decisions are quite
different from the poten tial ly positive effects of concurrenceseeking that they sugges t ed .

The problem exists when in the

final stage of decis i on -mak ing, after all the essential stages
for proper decision -mak ing have been completed, the vigilant
decision-maker i s likely to present what he feels is the best
solutio n or al te rnative in a biased fashion (Janis 1982).
By exami nin g the available literature on the event of the
May 1975 Mayaguez incident and the reactions produced from the
Ford Admi ni strat i on, i t is my purpose to ascertain if Janis'
analys i s of symptoms of groupthink is deficient and to extend
on his ass umption of purely psychological involvement leading
to groupthink.

As Janis states:

. . . my purpose is to describe and expla~n the
psychological processes that are at work, rather
than to establish historical continuities . . .
The central theme of my analysis can be summarized
in this generalization, which I offer in the spirit
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of Parkinso n' s la ws . The more amiability and esprit
de corps amo ng the members of a policy-making
group , the greate r i s the danger that independent
critical t hinki ng wi l l be replaced by groupthink,
which is like ly to result in irrational and
dehumanizing act i ons directed against out-groups.
(Janis 1982)
An added dimension of interest lies here surrounded by
the ambiguity of the succes s or failure of the Mayaguez incident
following the armed milita ry as sault by the United States.
Methodo logy
When examining the methodol ogy in a study like groupthink
analysis it must be taken in t o account that the information
that would be ideal for analyz i ng the groups dynamics of the
decision -makers is usual ly not available.

Information such

as detailed notes from meet ings and personalities involved
within the context of the gro up are unavailable either because
they have been classified (su ch as CIA intelligence reports) or
they do not exist .

Some in formation that Janis was able to use

in his study such as retrospective accounts that were recorded in
memoirs or declass i f i ed minutes of the meetings were not available
in analyzing the Mayag uez incident.
Though t he nat ure of the Mayaguez incident did not produce
i nforma ti on tha t Ja nis was able to use, there was a great deal
of in f ormation available on the subject.

Information available

in clude d a United States Air Force publication, ''Fourteen
at Koh Tang,

11

~ours

which documented the decision and proc€dures that
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were involved i n the military rescue; a report from the
Compt~oller

Ge neral ' s off ice to the subcommittee on International

Political and Mi l itary Affairs, Committee on International
Relations, House of Represe ntatives; and information provided by
the departments of State and defense.

Also available were

transcripts from interv i ews taken during the time of the
incident with Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James
R. Schlesinger, and articles that generally describe the
major characters and circumsta nces involving their relationships
and personalities .
With methodological co ntent in mind I can state that this
analysis, as in Janis ' analy sis, is limited to examining the
decisions that were impleme nt ed and analyzing them in the
context of their env i ronment .

As Janis stated:

For purposes of hypo thesis construction - which is the
stage of i nquiry with which this book is concerned we must be wil li ng to make some inferential leaps from
whatever historica l cl ues we can pick up. (Janis 1982)
It is the importance of the environmental historical
that I believe is understated in Janis' analysis.

~ontext

Its

influe nce as an exte r na l sti muli affecting the psychological
process of t he decis i on-ma king group is undoubtedly important
to gro upth in k.
A critici sm of Tetloc k's was that groupthink inalysis was
defi c i ent in sci enti f ic experimentat ion.

He proposed that

errors can be made from the distortion of retrospective
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accou nts from ind i vidu al s who were involved or arbitrary
cr i teria in the dec i sio n to include or exclude data (Tetlock
1979) .

Tet l ock's cr i t icism is unsubstantial.

While it is

very possible for retrospective accounts to be incomplete or
deficient in order to make an individual appear better or
worse, it is highly unlike ly and improbable that the flavor and
circumstances surroundi ng a decision-making group's dynamics
and relationships will be hidden, altered, or doubted.
To emphasize , this analysis of the Mayaguez incident will
be examined by documented decisions made by the president and
the National Security Co uncil.

Analysis will be established

concerning the implementat ion of the decisions made and from
available informatio n of the documented sources and recorded
data on major indiv i dua ls and circumstances surrounding their
relationships.

In th i s context I would not consider the

interpretat i on or construction of analysis information in any
way arbitrary or de ficien t , as Tetlock suggests.
The med i a co ver ed the Mayaguez incident as a success
when it was cl ea r that there were conflicting f acts and
circumstances in es t ablishing this categorical result.

In

analyz ing the Mayaguez incident, we know from evidence in the
Air Force report, "Fourteen Hours at Koh Tang,

11

that the

res cue operation of the Mayaguez crew was actually a stroke of
luck produced by haphazard realities that caused casualties.
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The Air Force, by documenting the Mayaguez incident, supports
these facts and White House officials at the time stated in
The New York Times that during the planning and decisionmaking process the outcome was not known in terms of a success
or failure in rescuing the crew.
In the Mayaguez incident there were clearly internal and
external stimuli affecting the decision-making group.

Janis

refers to these stimuli as antecedent conditions consisting of
two types :

structural faults of the organization and provocative

situation context .
the

It is my purpose to extend the examination of

elationship of the antecedent conditions leading to groupthink -

specifically the relat 1onsh1p between the internal and external
sources of stimuli and their effect on individuals in the
decision-making group .

In analyzing the external sources of

stimuli this thesis will have to examine the historical
environmental situation leading up to and including the Mayaguez
incident and to what extent it affected the internal psychological
process of the decision-making group.
The environmental situation would provide us with the
ability to exam ine what, if any, role it played in the decisions
made by the group.

Conditions involved in the Mayaguez incident

are good candidates for situational context analysis but not
every situation will be affected by external stimuli and even
if it is present, there is no assutance that gtoupthin
occurred exclusively because of it without examination.

The
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exam i natio n of the relatio nship involving internal and external
stimuli and their effects on contributing to groupthink symptoms
provided a much more comp l ete analysis in establishing whether
groupthink was a factor in th e decision-making process of the
Mayaguez incident and other incidents where external stimuli
exhibited potential i nvolveme nt in analysis.
The Dec i s i on -Mak ing Group
The National Security Counc i l (NSC) initially was an advisory
group that reviewed foreign pol icy issues and provided the
perception toward developing t he formal processes for foreign
policy planning and decisions .

The NSC evolved and established

itself as the presidential fo reig n policy staff providing
support for presidential dec isi on

It is limited to a formal

membership of four - the pre sident, the vice president, the
secreta y of state an d t he secre t ary of defense.

However, at the

time of the Mayaguez incident, advisors to the group included the
assistant to the presi dent f or national security affairs, the
chairman of the jo in t chiefs of staff, the director of the ·
Central Inte ll ige nce Agen cy (CIA), and (since 1975) the Directot
of t he arms co ntro l and di sarmament agency (Destler 1977}.
Durin g th e Mayagu ez incident there were four meetiMgs held
by the Na tional Security Council over a three-day period, May
2- 14.

President Ford met with this group of advisors that

flu ctua te d between 10 and 14 members.

fhe first meeting was
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held approximately seven hours after Washington received notice
of the seizure and i nclu ded Vice President Nelson Rockefeller,
Secretary of State He nry Kissinger (who acted in his other role
as assistant to the pres i dent f or national security affairs),
the department of state was represented by Deputy Secretary of
State and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger (who was fired
by the president in November 1975).

The advisors initially

included the Director of the CIA William Colby (who was also
fired by the president later that year ) , Deputy Secretary of
Defense General David Jones the act ing chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (the cha i rman was overseas at the time), Assistant
to the President Donald Rumsfe ld (who would soon become the new
Secreta y of Defense) , Depu ty Assistant for National Security
Affairs Brent Scowcroft (who would soon become the assistant
for National Security Affa irs and was considered to be the
protege~ of

Henry Kissin ger).

Also present was the Senior

NSC Staff Off i cer fo r ea st Asia, Richard Smyser.

Other advisors

who would subseque nt ly join the group were councils to the
president :

Joh n Ma r sh , Robert Hartmann, and Philip

Bu~hen.

Chief of Na val Operat i ons Admiral James Holloway would also be
prese nt at t he f our t h meeting (U.S. Congress 1976).
A primary consideration in determining the presence of the
grou pthin

syndrome is unders tanding the relationship between

t he members in the deci s ion-making group.

The president was
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at the top of the chain of command and was perceived as the
individual respons i ble for making the final decisions that were
implanted during the Mayag uez incident.

In the everyday procedures

of the office, Ford's style of leadership was affected by his
personality and lack of executive experience.

Ford let his

personal feelings and friendship get in the way of disciplining
his staff; he was much too tol erant for mediocre work and this
was seen as a major flaw in hi s ma nagerial skills (Wayne 1977).
Ford's long experience as a United States congressman from
Michigan was one of working in groups and committees where
confidence in the decis i on -makin g process was established during
meetings.

With Ford's famil i ar role as team player he was not

confident in his position as a decision-maker.

Ford liked to

make decisions during meet i ngs when key advisors were present
and would ask for a variety of views on a topic to minimize
the possibility of over l ooking and/ or underrating options and
their consequences .

Once Fo r d's insecurity was eliminate<l

through the group dec i s i on -ma king process he did not hesitate
in finalizing dec i sio ns and ha ving them carried out, and he
was not afraid of ask ing ques t ions involving decisions and
the i r conseq uenc es .
Ford' s previous experience as congressional minority leader
was bas i ca lly a reactionary one.

He was adept in coordinat «ng

t he oppo s ition with short-term perceptibility and during the
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Nixon Administration he was a maj or participant in organizing
suppo~t

for the president .

But Ford's previous work provided him

with little or no experience in forming a coherent and consistent
program to use as a base for running his election campaign in 1976
and led to his inability to effective ly administrate the executive
branch of the government .

It was Ford's good image and his strong

support of the Republican Party that got him appointed vice
president and not his strength as a leader of the party.

It was

Ford's perceived characteristic of being an ineffective leader
that led to his demise in the election of 1976 when the people
decided that they needed more than someone who would restore
dignity and honesty to the office after Watergate.

To illustrate

Ford's inability to be effective where foreign policy was
concerned, one White House official who had worked for both
Ford and Nixon pointed out that, unlike Nixon, Ford approached
foreign policy on a problem-by-problem basis, while an aide
stated that Ford did not have any structured world view (New
York Times 1975).
Ford, in establishing himself as president, wanted to be
accessible and he also relied heavily on his senior staff for
developing policy ideas much more than Nixon had.

The president's

accessibility led to a breakdown in the line of authority,
producing confusion within the admin istration because it
resulted in a f lexible system where lines of responsibility
wer e not clearly drawn; thus making it much more likely for
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individuals to assert cla i ms over a particular area to protect
it from being influenced by other factions in the administration.
An example of influential asse r tion happening in the Ford
Administration concerned the appo i ntment of the executive
director of the domestic co unc i l .

Vice President Rockefeller's

interests were in influencing domes tic affairs where he dominated
the policy direction and operational control of the Domestic
Counc il.

He wanted his long - time asso ci ate James Cannon to

fill the position.

Assistant to the President Donald Rumsfeld,

who was a friend of Ford's, urged the appointment of Assistant
Council, Phillip Areeda .
was appointed .

Ford sided wi th Roc kefeller and Cannon

Though friendships di d i nfluence the working

process of the Ford Administrati on, Cannon's appointment
strongly suggests that Rockefeller ' s control over domestic
affairs was established to a point where his influence on the
president concernin g ap pointments was clearly apparent (Wayne
1977) .

The unique and most dom inan t character involved in the
National Secur i ty Co un cil was Henry Kissinger, who has been
desc ibed as havi ng a "st arring" style produc ed as much from
hi s perso nality as f rom his intellectual and academic background.
During th e period of the Mayaguez incident Kissinger held the
pos ition s of secretary of state and assistant for National
Securi t y Affairs, which gave him an unparallel ed personal
dominance as a participant in the decision-making process and
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also woul d i mp ly an i mba lance in the National Security Council
toward the State De par t ment vis-a-vis other departments involved.
Clearly , to understa nd t he relationship of the individuals in
the decision -making group one must understand the individualistic
and egocentric nature of Henry Kissinger.

He was accustomed to

working with a small group of assistants in the National Security
Council and was known for hi s inability to consult with other
high officials in the adm i ni strat i on (Gilboa 1976).
Kissinger's idiosyncrasi es were a major contribution to the
dismissal, in November 1975 , of Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger .
president

While Ford pr i de d hi mself as being an accessible

Schlesinger foun d i t most difficult to establish

a relationship and commun i ca te with the president.
Ford

Schlesinge

To reach

had to go t hrough Kissinger which made it

difficult, if not impossible , for his to express any
disagreements that he may have had with the secretary of state.
Janis describes his pro tective behavior as

11

mindguard,

11

a

characteristic symptom of groupthink where an individual
insulates ideas f rom being exposed to the decision-making
group .

Ki ss in ger ' s be havior illustrates that mindguard did

take pl ace du r ing t he Mayaguez incident.

The exact purpose

i s not cer t ain - whether to insu1ate Ford from differing
ideas or to protect Kissinger's own position as primary
for e ign poli cy maker.

In any event, mindguard was present even

with Ford's preferred style of accessibility.
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Kissinger's mindguard behavior was not just isolated
by the Mayaguez incident :

it was an ongoing thing where the

relationship precipitated Schlesinger to publicly question
Ford's defense budget and the advisability of the concessions
that Kissinger was offering to the Soviets at the time concerning
d~tente and the limitation of strategic weapons (Balfour 1975).

Ford would later comment ''I need a feeling of comfort with an
organization:

no tension, complete cohesion," and that his

decision to fire Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was to avoid
11

growing tension

11

in his administration (Nathan 1976).

The

description here is a classic and primary characteristic applied
to groupthink and the circumstances surrounding the decisionmaking group's relationship can provide some insight to those
that were involved in the decision-making process of the
Mayaguez incident.
Other members in the group included Donald Rumsfeld who
had developed a close friendsh ip with President Ford when
they were both members of Congress.

During the Mayaguez

incident his position was essent ially that of chief of staff,
though officially he was chief personal advisor to the president.
The importance of his position in the administration would
soon increase when he replaced James Schlesinger as secretary
of defense.

The important aspect to understand is that his

effect iv eness wou d also increase when Brent Scowcroft took
over Henry Kissinger's position as head of the National Security
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Council, leaving Kissinger as secretary of state and limiting
his direct influence on the president.
As Nancy Balfour (1975) explains, with Henry Kissinger
no longer on the president's personal staff, it would be
more probable that the president would be presented with a
wider variety of alternatives for foreign policy decisions.
Rumsfeld shared Schlesinger 's reservations on Kissinger's
./

theory of detente, but would eventually have easier access to
the p esident to express the view of the defense department.
Thus it would not be necessary for Rumsfeld to experience
pressure to compromise as Schlesinger did for the sake of
political expediency.
The relationships involved in the foreign policy decisionmaking process of the Ford Administration were brought out in
a New Yo k Times article on May 28, 1975, stating that Ford
was determined to influence foreign policy more and not to
rely on Kissinger for his input and primary status in
establishing U.S. foreign policy.
stated ,

11

A White House official

The problem with the NSC from the president's

point of view is that it is narrowly focused on foreign
affairs and security.

But the president cannot have input

on foreign policy from people with tunnel vision.
policy does not exist in a vacuum.

11

Foreign

These dominant personal

relation shi ps are important in understanding the Ford
Administration, with Rockefeller and Kissinger exerting
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influence in their respective areas.

Also important to remember

is the fact that Kissinger had established his position in
foreign policy during the Nixon Administration making it very
hard on Ford to assert himself.

But the relationships were

essentially allowed to perpetuate because of Ford's character
and lack of executive experience.

Even though Ford was an

accessible president and wanted to be supplied with a wide
range of alternatives for decision-making, his easy - going
personality hindered this process, essentially because he had
not developed for himself a secure position as decision -maker .
Background and Context of the Mayaguez Incident
Prior to the Mayaguez incident the countries of Vietnam
and Cambodia had fallen as a consequence of a North Vietnamese
victory .

As a U.S. fore ign policy failure, the communist

victory was a humiliation to the United States and was
anticipated that there would be a loss of U.S.
Southeast Asia .

influenc~

in

In January 1975 President Ford requested

Cong ess to appropriate $522 million to supplement military
aid for the cou ntries of Cambodia and Vietnam.

At the time

there was a general anti-Vietnam sentiment in the Congress
and the appropriations essentially never had a chance of bein
passed.

It was thought that the failure to provide suppol

for these countries precipitated the communist victor
took place by May 1975 (Destlel 1977) .
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Kissinger took these developments personally, because he
had known that the possib i l i ty of a communist takeover was
good, but he did not feel that the situation could occur as
quickly as it did .

Kissinger ' s reacti on to the fall of

Cambodia and Vietnam, and the sus pension of his mission to the
Middle East in March 1975 , was highly emotional.

As the dominant

foreign policy advisor in the adm i ni st ration it was Kissinger's
job to interpret signals from unstabl e international areas for
U. S. foreign policy and predict what wa s to happen.

Consequently

the p emature communist victory over Cambodia and Vietnam caught
Kissinger when it was clear that his planning for such an
occurrence was inadequate - leav ing the United States with no
viable foreign policy pos i tion to follow.
Also during the time of the Mayaguez incident, decisionmakers remembered the situat i on in 1968 when the Pueblo and its
crew were seized and Un ited States suffered humiliation in
Southeast Asia i n the negot iation process.

Viewed in this

light , the seizure of the Mayag uez could be perceived by
decision-makers as a del ibera te t esting of U.S. will,
requir i ng prompt and decis ive action.

Bu t as th e comptroller

ge nera l 's report point s out (U.S. Congress 19 76), during the
t i me of t he Mayaguez incident, the United States di-0 not know
who controll ed th e Cambodian governme nt nor the purpose of the
act ion s ta ken against the Mayague z .

When the communists took

over, communication had ceased to provide the outside world
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with accurate informat i on with any regularity or reliability.
In retrospect , the United States government was not interested
in the purpose behind the seizure.

Indicating this point, one

defense official believed the th reat against the U.S. government
was that the United States woul d receive another humiliating
embarrassment in Southeast As i a .

It was felt that another blow

to United States' foreign po l icy was a potential risk with the
seizu e of the Mayaguez (U . S. Congre ss 1976).
Though information com i ng out of Cambodia prior to the
seizure was limited, there was su f f icient evidence available to
suggest some motivations beh i nd the Cambodian actions.

Information

concerning Cambodian act i ons was avail able at the first National
Security Council meeting t hat took place approximately seven
hours after Washington received notice of the seizure.
P evious knowledge incl ude d:
- Ten days befo re t he seizure a group of Thai fishing
boats had been se i zed and later released by Cambodia.
- Eight days befo re t he seizure Cambodian patrol boats
had fired upon and unsuccessfully attempted to seize
a South Korean sh i p.
- Si x days befo re the seizure vessels fleeing from South
Viet nam and a Vi et nam government craft were seized
by Cambod i a .
- Fi ve days before the seizure Cambodia had stopped,
se iz ed and searched a Panamanian vessel which it
re l eas ed about 36 hours later.
- Fiv e days before the seizute Cambodian authorities
were focusing attention on the need to control
ce rtain outlying islands because of possible
petroleum reserves.
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Three days before the se izure evidence suggested that
the new Cambodian governme nt was claiming a 90 mile
territorial limit and planned to seize all foreign
ships violating such limits (U.S. Congress 1976).
The above information strongly suggests that the new Cambodian
government felt it was necessary to show some sign of authority
to establish legitimation in other country 's perceptions.
Following the Mayaguez incident, The New York Times reported
that the Cambodian government's stated purpose behind seizing
the

ayaguez was the belief that it was a CIA spying vessel.

The Cambodians clai med that previously seized vessels admitted
to CIA involvement.

Upon the U. S. military reaction, the

Cambodians also stated that they let the Mayaguez and crew go
because their "weak country cannot have a confrontation with
the U.S.A."
it

With evidence of the Cambod ian's recent actions,

strongly appea s that the frequency in which they occurred

would suggest a greater possibility of the ship and crew being
released .
Diplomatic Measures Toward a Solution
The Ford Administration received a lot of criticism
because of its quick decision to mo ve from diplomatic to
military measures in solving the seizure of the Mayaguez.
After the first meeting of the National Security Council
(1:50 p.m. on May 12) a statement was released by the
president stating that the seiz ure was considered an action
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of piracy and demanding t he i mmediate release of the ship.
The failure to do so wo ul d have the most serious consequences.
Later that afte r noon a request was made by the State
Department to the Chinese l ia ison office in Washington to deliver
a message to the Cambodians .

The request was denied and it was

decided to ma e contact through th e U.S. liaison office in
Peking, where messages were del ivered to the Cambodian embassy
thee and to the Foreign Min i stry of t he People's Republic
of China .

Early Wednesday morn ing on May 14 the State Department

found out that the Chinese autho rities in Pe king had returned
to our liaison office in Peking our intended message to the
Cambodians .

No account or reaso n is given for the Chinese not

delivering the U. S. message , but it is likely that the Chinese
commu ists had sympathetic lea nin gs toward the communist regime
in Cambodia .

In any event , t here had been no response to the

U. S. message that was sen t directly to the Cambodians.
Follow i ng these de vel opments U.N. Ambassador Scali of the
United States de li vered a let t er on May 14 to U.N. Secretary
Waldeim request in g ass is t ance in securing the release of the
Mayaguez an d its crew.

The U.N. secretary respon<led by getting

in di rect communi cat ion with the Cambodians and the United
States , appealing to both governments to seek a peaceful
r esolve to the Mayaguez incident.
a res pon se wa s not

Accotding to U.N. records,

eceived by t he sec etary general from the

Cambodians until May 19 (U.S. Congress 1976).
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When asked in an interview on May 16 whether there was any
chance toward a diplomatic resolution, Kissinger stated:
There was no chance during this crisis to resolve it
diplomatically . That is to say, we never received a
communication - proposit ion - that would have enabled
us to explore a diplomatic solution, and it was - by
Wednesday evening we had not yet received any reply
that the president ordered the military operations to
begin (U.S. Congress 1975) .
Approximately three to four hours after U.N . Ambassador Scali
delivered the U.S . request to the secretary general on the 14th,
the U.S . issued orders to begin a military assault operation;
they did not wait for the process of diplomacy to finish before
initiating a military reaction.
At 7:07 p. m. on May 14, the Cambodian government broadcast
a message from the Phnom Penh domestic radio station, saying:
. . . (the royal government) will order the Mayaguez
to withdraw from Cambodian territorial waters and will
warn it against further espionage or provocative
activities . This applies to the Mayaguez or any
other ships like the ship flying the Panama flag
which we released on May 9, 1975 .
The Cambodian message followed essentially with their pattern
of actions prior to the seizure of the Mayaguez, but was
interpreted in Washington as insufficient to cease military
assault because the status of the crew members was not
mentioned specifically .

Ironically, the initial White House

statement on the seizure was referred to only in the context
of the ship and did not mention the crew spec i fically .
. . . The President has met with the NSC. He
considers this seizure as an act of piracy. He
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has instructed the State Depa rtment to demand t he
immediate release of the shi p. Failure to do so
would have the most ser i ous consequences (U.S.
Congress 1976).
The Cambodian message was rece ived by wire services in Washington
at 8:19 p. m. , a few minutes after President Fo r d and the NSC
received it .

According to White Hou se and Pentagon logs, the

rescue operation had already been underway for about one hour
with helicopters on the way to the Mayagu ez fro m the airbase
in Thailand .

Due to inaccurate estimates of enemy strength

the rescue forces encountered hostile fir e now forcing the
continuance of military operations .

White Hou se reaction was

to issue a statement to the Cambodians say i ng that the United
States would cease military action upon t he release of the crew.
The release of the crew was taking pla ce , but hasty reactions
loc ' ed the United States into mi l i tary measures.
Mil i tary Mea sures Toward a Solution
The decisions that were ma de concerning the military
rescue operation were conducted through a military chain of
command.

The president is comma nder in chief of the armed

forces and makes the ultimate decisi ons on mi li t ary actions.
He i s adv i sed by the Nat i onal Security Council, whose
operat i onal purpose i s t o provide options and discuss i on
concern i ng po li cy -mak ing.

At t he top of the chain, then,

i s t he Nat iona l Command Au t hority, consisting of the preside nt
and th e sec ret ary of defense, followed by the Joint Ch i efs of
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Staff to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINPAC), who have
planning and operational responsibility for the entire
military rescue operation of the Mayaguez incident (see
Appendix 2) .

{U . S. Congress 1976).

Though CINPAC had control over the local command, it
gave control of the Mayaguez incident to local command in
developing the rescue operation that took place.

What is

significant is that foreign policy experts and other military
experts were not involved in the development of the rescue
operation.

Expert information here would have been valuable in

deciding what type of military procedure was appropriate or
whether one would be appropriate at all.

The involvement of

more people would have established more debate on the
development for U.S. actions - but the existence of a true
debate toward alternatives did not take place during the
Mayaguez incident.

Support here is established by the fact

that the extra administrat ion advisors and chief of naval
operations were only present at the last National Securit.y
Council meeting - indicating the lack of significance
placed on gathering exper i enced knowledge to contribute
to the decision-making process.

Lack of involvement was also

exhibited by initial members of the group with the statement
by the deputy secretary of state's claim that he contributed
very lit t l e to the discussions that did go on .
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This is not to say that Washington did not play the
central figure in the decision-making process, through Ford
and Kissinger, concerning the military operation .

The proces s

of rapid communications encourages the use of a central control
over the use of force in any situation.

During the Mayaguez

incident, rapid communications permitted the president to
decide whether to attack a vessel heading toward the mainland
which was suspected of carrying Mayaguez crew members, and at
a later point in the incident , to cancel and then reinstate
the initial air strikes against Kompong Som.

With the use of

rapid communications it was strongly apparent that the United
States was not locked into the military assault and that there
was an option available to recall the initiated rescue operation.
If the president wanted it so, the military attack could have
been halted.
The military apparatus initiated its part in the Mayaguez
incident by gathering information through military reconnaissance
to determine military assets that were required for the operation .
It was the military that researched the options and recommendations
for the president to choose from, not the National Security
Council, foreign policy advisors, or other experts.

The

military operation included units from three sections of the
U.S. military:

the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps .

The

choice of military strategy that was decided on was as follows :
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1.

locate the Mayague z,

2.

prevent further mo vement of the ship,

3.

iso l ate Koh Tang to prevent movement of the
crew or reinforceme nt of the island, and

4.

retake the Mayague z and re scue the crew
believed to be on Koh Tang (targets on the
mainland were bombed to pro te ct U.S. forces)
(U.S . Congress 1976) .

The Air Force publication , "Fourtee n Hours at Koh Tang"
(Des B isay 1976)

gives some insight on how haphazard the

mi itary operation was and how in effectual the policy-making
was with respect to getting the Maya guez and the crew back.
It

as a little over an hour after the military assault

started that the crew was retur ned wi th out previous knowledge
of the rescue forces and taken aboard the USS Wilson.

The

return of the crew shifted the whole operation to recovering
the assault forces that were now on Koh Tang.

The situation was

grim with 130 mar in es meeting heavy resistance, necessitating
reinforcements i nto withd rawing them from the island.
Eventually a total of 230 mar ines had to be recovered fro m
Koh Tang by he l icopte r evacua tion.

Planners of the operation

had no way to establ i s h a sce nario of the outcome prior to its
imp l ementatio n du e to th e tremendous unce r tainty and unfavorable
condi t i ons .

The Air Force documentation of the operation

sta te d t he outcome was not established until the last minutes
of th e oper at ion.

Cl early th e uncetta inty the military planners
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had must have been expressed to the decision-makers in
Washington, yet the developments that did take place suggested
that contingency plans had not been established by the decisionmaking group should unforseen circumstances arise requiring the
operation to deviate from the original plan.

In retrospect

there is no evidence that contingency plans did exist.
The center of the military operation had then shifted from
rescuing the crew to getting the assault force off the island
and it appeared that the events of the rescue operation taking
place had been operationally planned.

In actuality, the Air

Force attributes the controlled appearance,

11
•••

in the face

of almost total uncertainty for planners and terribly unfavorable
conditions fo

participating helicopters and marines . . . ",

to their brave, unhesitating character and to their excellent
training.

If it were not for the strong support of U.S.

Air Force and Navy units during the Marine evacuation on Koh
Tang it is certain the resulting circumstances could have been
much worse (Des Brisay 1977).
. Illusion of Unanimity
A unanimous feeling can have a decidedly curious effect
on a group of decision-makers.

There is a sense of

authority the individual feels that justifies the belief in
the truth of the group.

Janis states that the reliance on

consensual validation tends to replace individual critical
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th i nking and reality - test ing, unless there are clear-cut
disagreements among the members (Janis 1982).

The Mayaguez

incident opened up an oppo rtunity for the U.S. government to
flex its muscles that would produce the desired effect of a
display of strength.

It was made clear three days after the

seizure of the vessel when De fense Secretary Schlesinger and
State Secretary Kissinger stated in T.he New York Times that they
were eager to find some dramatic means of underscoring President
Ford's stated intention to "maintain our leadership on a
worldwide basis . "
During the Mayaguez dec i s i on -making procedure the rescue
and return of the crew was stated as being the primary objective.
If the crew's safety was pa ramount, how can a military rescue
assault be established when t he location of the crew members
was not known?

Logically there was no way to form the basis of

U. S. actions when informa tion t hat was central to the U.S.
military operation was not known.

Also strongly evident here

was the knowledge of Cambod ian actions during the previous days
and weeks l ea di ng up t o t he captu re of the Mayaguez.

The

pattern of act i ons disp l aye d gave t he lJni t ed States a very strong
indicat i on th at t he Mayag uez and crew would soon be released.
If evidence was no t so strong, uncertainty surrounding the
Mayaguez situation might be considered a variable influencing
the National Security Council to move quickly from a diplomatic
to a military solution.

But a review of the literature
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surrounding the Mayaguez incident showed that White House
off i cift l s act ually stated in The New York Times that they
acknowledged t he Mayaguez incident as a 11 calculated gamble
with a broad purpose . " If the central purpose had been the
safe return of the Mayaguez crew, there would have been a
calculated effort for i ntelligence to find its position.

The

move to act as quickly as the U.S . government did or in such an
aggressive manner would not have t aken place.

When one observes

that the primary purpose was t o produce a show of force by the
U.S. government to display to others U.S. intentions in Southeast
Asia, the line of decis ion-mak i ng becomes clearer to the observer.
The safety of the crew co uld not have been the primary concern
because there would have bee n dissention in the decision-making
group as to the risks invo lv ed re lating to the safety of the
crew .

Unanimity was stro ngly present with Ford, Kissinger,

and Schlesinger all emphasizing the U.S. show of force as a
broad base purpose , an d Admi nistration officials including
Kissinger and Schlesi nger stated that a means was necessary to
"mainta i n our l ea ders hip on a worldwide basis. 11
Kiss in ger in a 1962 article on the Cuban missi l e crisis,
wrote "t hat a grea t power leads not so much by its woros as by
i ts ac tion s , that initiative creates consensus'' (New York Times
1975 ).

Kissinger is describing here qui t e distinctly the type

of con se nsus -seeking that was taking place during the Mayaguez
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incident.
respo~ded

The procedure through which the United States
to the Cambodian capture had taken precedent to a

casua 1ty-free or mini.ma l -casua 1ty outcome.
In terms of a unanimous feeling of the decision-making
group there is clear evidence that external pressure was
present on both Ford and Kissinger .

The situational context

that produced pressure on President Ford was coming from his
election campaign.
11

In order for him to establish himself as a

take charge" decisive leader he had to prove himself.

If Ford

did not project an authoritative image he would have left
himself vulnerably open to attack by the election opposition if
he did not prove his leadership capab ilities.

The situation

produced by the capture of a U.S . merchan t ship by a small
communist country gave Ford the opportun ity to react in an
aggressive, "gutsy" manner.

The reaction described here is

inherent in human nature - we have to prove ourselves and
consequently give little thought to the outcome.
In a structured theory it is not possible to fully
account for inherent human actions .

What is unique about

groupthink is that Janis makes an effort through his
antecedent conditions to incorporate human factors and
variables that will affect decision-making, especially
where co ncurre nce-seeking tendencies are involved in a group
process.

These antecedent conditions play an integral part

in groupthi nk where they wi 11 affect the process of concurrence-

41

seeking .
from

~hese

It i s the react ion of individuals that are produced
antecedent condit ions of psychological pressures

and situationa l context that will influence the way that a
person makes a decision .

Exte r nal stress are variables that

a e deficiently described by Janis in their relationship and
effects upon the decision -maki ng group.
To further explain the ex i stence of external pressure
toward concurrence-seeking invo l ved during the Mayaguez incident,
Henry Kissinger had just exper ie nced some failures involved in
the developments of U. S. foreig n po licy.

Though the president

is the final decision -maker concerning all aspects of U.S.
foreign policy, Kissinger, at the t i me of the incident, had an
unprecedented position as head foreign policy maker.

Kissinger's

recent failures involved Mi dd le East peace negotiations, the
lack of congressional support fo r U.S. aid to Southeast Asia,
emphasized with the un expected communist takeover of Cambodia
and Vietnam .

These are ex amples of recent situational contexts

that placed Kiss in ger in a position where he would feel the
need to prod uce an i nfl ue ntial situation to counteract some
of the fa il ures lead in g up to the Mayaguez incident.
In effect the s i t uat ional contexts described above
in f lu enced both Ford and Kissinger and consequently forced
t he direc tion of their decision to use a military rescue
ope r at ion.

The ir motives were f reely admitted by themselves

and administration officials in the media.

But to compound
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the external stress on decision-makers, a large source of
group consensus develope d during the Mayaguez incident through
the external stres s that t he situation itself produced.

As

a source of stress in the dec ision-making group the Mayaguez
incident changed its goal from the successful rescue of the
ship and crew to a situation where the procedure of a military
operation would place U. S. i ntentions on display with the
distinct side effects of influencing the U.S. position in
Southeast Asia and the improve d image of President Ford as a
national leader .
Another example of assumed conse nsus toward an illusion
of unanimity was mentioned earl ier.

It can be observed in

the state department ' s input of the decision-making process
during

he Mayaguez incident .

The comptroller general's

report was unable to determ in e the extent of state's input,
but a good indicatio n was given by the deputy secretary of
state.

He stated that his role was essentially that of an

observer and that he contr ibuted little to the discussions.
From this evi dence it strongly appears that the state department's
role was li mi ted to one of delivering U.S. messages in
Was hin gto n, New Yor k, and Peking (U.S. Congress 1976).
Conj ecture here produced a failure toward any possible
di plomat i c res olution but also emphasizes that the approval
di s pl ayed in the Mayaguez inc ident was not the approval to
ri s k t he lives of the crew; that had already become a secondary
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objective .

The approva l displayed was that the United States

was wi lling to use military measures as a tool to show hostile
forces U. S. capabilit i es and intentions.
The source of group co nsensus developed during the
Mayaguez incident through the external stimuli the situation
itself produced, but it was be ing i nfluenced by the external
sources of stress that was ind ividually affecting Ford and
Kissinger toward premature concurrence-seeking for a military
rescue operation .

In relati onshi p to the group the external

stress of the situational contex t wa s directly emphasizing
the psychological structural fa ults of the decision-making
group, not allowing for a gro up process toward quality
decision-making to take pl ace.
While tacit, if not consc i ous approval is sure to have
taken place during the four Nat ional Security Council meetings
prior to the rescue ope rat ion, approval was publicly voiced
afterward .

The influence produced was tremendous and extended

much further than just the dec ision-making group involved.
The media heralded the rescue a success and The New York Times
stated that vi r tua l unani mi ty had been created between the
co ngress and admini stra tion concerning the return of the
Mayag uez - somet hing that had not taken place on an issue
concerning Southeast Asia in a long time.
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Illusion of Invulnerability
An illusion of invulnerability is characteristic of a
feeling of unanimity but it extends further to productive
measures of the group, taking the form of unnecessary risks
that are involved in the course of action decided on.

The

acceptance or nondiscussion of risks is also part of what
Janis called the illusion of invulnerability and contains
two themes:

( 1) "We are a strong group of good guys who

will win in the end."
bad guys.

11

(2) "Our opponents are stupid, weak,

(Janis 1982).

Janis

1

descri pt i ans here are

broad generalizations and can be extended.

The Mayaguez

incident produced goals that were stated as being broadly
based, providing a much greater margin of error and more
reason to be optimistic.

By showing our military strength

the United States was proving a point and producing a
situation where decision-makers become overoptimistic concerning
the successful outcome of the goals involved, specifically the
United States' image abroad .

But a very interesting point

concerning the optimism of the decision-making group is that
rescuing the crew was a very emotional issue.

It would be

very easy for the Nationa l Security Council to gain support for
a quick military rescue when there are hostages endangered by
cornmun is t captors.

Opt i mi srn, Janis points out, is pa rt of th.e

feeling of invulnerability and correlates with the feeling that
the military operation was considered "gutsy."
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To elaborate on the illusion of invulnerability, the
decis~on-makers

ass umed th at we had an inherent right to

the use of Thailand terr itory during the military operation
when they knew that the Tha i government would be sensitive
to the issue .

When asked by a reporter why the United States

had not made an effort to con sult with the Thai government
before we sent in the marines Kissinger stated:
Well the assumption was tha t we were in an emergency
situation in which, on occas io n, we have acted without
having had a dull opportun i ty for consultation, and it
was therefore thought that within the traditional
relationship it would be a measure that would be
understood . In any event i t would have presented
massive problems either way .
In retrospect it was easier for t he United States to go ahead
and use the Thai territory and apologize for the indiscretion
later as we did .

In any respe ct , the military operation would

include the use of the Tha i te rritory and consulting with their
government wou l d ha ve produced more problems and slowed down
the military operation .
Here we can observe t he ex istence of the direc t relationship
that the situat i on prod uced by the capture of the Mayaguez:

it

affected the dec i s i on-makers• belief th at t he Unite d States had
the r i ght to use the Thai territory witho ut prior permission.
Co nce rn here was not even directed by repercussions that might
de ve lop f rom the United States• actions.

In effect Kissinger

i s sta ting that the group was feeling an illusion of invulnerability
du e to th e situation and classi fying it in terms of an emergency.
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Following this line of thinking the administration
respo nded to cr it ici sm it receiv€d concerning the president's
respons i bil i ty t o co nsult with congress before initiating the
use of U. S. armed forces i n accordance with section 3 of the
War Powers Resolution.

The administration's response was

basically the same one used co ncerning the use of the Thai
territory without permission ; tak ing the position that the
president has certain inherent powers to protect American lives
and American property .

While t he administration did inform

some members of congress on developments during the incident, it
did not consult with them .

The lack of congressional involvement

was essentially overlooked as an issue after the incident was
over, due to the establ i shed outcome and overall approval that
was exhibited

These two i ndi scretions also prove that decision-

makers were very opt i mi st ic t hat the potential for them being
blown out of pro portio n woul d be defused by the emotional issue
of rescuing the crew members from capture.
Due to what the Defense Department called a tactical
value for a preemptive str i ke, the operation to rescue the
crew appears to have bee n unnecessarily hurried and essentially
in creased the r i sks involved.

The operation proceeded with

in ade quate in te lligence gathering on the location of the crew
and expec t ed oppo s ition of forces on Koh Tang.
at Koh Ta ng,

11

"Fourteen hours

documented by the U.S. Air Force, indicated

t his uncertainty:
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How many were being held, or even if any were held
there (Koh Tang) was unknown - there had, however,
been nighttime shuttle runs by Cambodian patrol
boats between the Mayaguez and gunship crews
observed personnel movement on the beach during
the shuttle activities. Although a group of
personnel was spotted aboard a fishing boat
heading for the mainland on the 14th, the strong
possibility that at least some crew members were
being held on the island could not be ignored.
Thus the helicopters and marines headed for Koh
Tang uncertain as to the presence, number or
whereabouts of the Mayaguez crew members.
Also unknown was the degree of enemy resistance
which would be encountered, but preflight
briefings based on estimates of Khmer communist
strength at the island indicated the resistance
should be low. Preparation of the landing zones
with air strikes was ruled out to preclude
inadvertent injury to Mayaguez crew members
who conceivably could be in the landing zone
areas. Air cover would be available overhead,
however, should enemy resistance be greater than
expected. Once the eight helicopters had inserted
their marines, they, along with the choppers
flying to the USS Holt, were to return to their
staging base for a second wave should the extra
men be required. It was a difficult scenario,
and one fraught with uncertainties. There were
not the circumstances a military commander would
choose for such a rescue mission (Des Brisay 1977).
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was asked in an interview
whether the degree of faulty intelligence (the fact that no
members of the Mayaguez crew were on Koh Tang) bothered him.
He evaded the question by saying we did not know whether part
of the crew was on the island or if all the members had been
moved. This reiterates the fact of inadequate intell1gence
gathering and that U.S. forces and decision-makers did not know
where the crew was during the assault, which was central to
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the military operation, thus forming no basis for U.S.
actions (U.S. Congress 1975).

(See map on page 71 concerning

movement of crew members.)
As it turned out it was the fishing boat, described
above, that transported the Mayaguez crew from Koh Tang to
the Cambodian mainland then back to a small island off the
mainland called Koah Tang Sam Learn.

It was her€ that the

crew members remained until their release.

Information was

collected by U.S. pilots but was incompletely passed to
decision-makers.

Although continued reconnaissance in the

area was direct, the fishing boat was not designated as a
target of significant interest.

Included in poor information

was the innaccuracy of intelligence - Defense Intelligence
assembled information on May 12 claiming Koh Tang had between
150 and 200 Khmer Communist forces on the island that were
heavily armed.

Estimates of the armaments included:

. . . armed with 82mm mortars; 75mm recoiless
rifles; 30-caliber, 7.62mm, and 12.?mm machine
guns; and 840/41 rocket propelled grenade
launchers. Also, the Defense Intelligence
Agency estimated that:
1.
2.

3.

An additional 1,500 to 2,000 Khmer
communists were in the Kompong Som/
Ream area.
There were 24 to 28 Khmer communist
naval craft armed with 3-inch guns,
20/40mm antiair.craft weapons, and
50-caliber, 7.£2mm, 12.7mm machine
guns.
An unknown number of 23/37mm AAA
weapons were at known sites at Ream
Airfield.
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4.

There were a small number of T-28, AU-24,
AC-47 and delo gunships with unknown
operational status and locations (U.S.
Congress 1976).

Contrary to this, Intelligen ce Pacific in Hawaii had information
by May 13 claiming forces on the island were between 90 to 100,
reinforced by a heavy weapons squad of 10 to 15.
These two intelligence organizations were supposed to be
communicating with each other to establish preceding estimates
for the marine assault forces .

The Defense Department claims

that the two forces were in communication, but only the information
from Intelligence Pacific was received by the local command and
caused Marine personnel to inaccurately estimate the inhabitants
of Koh Tang at about 100 people, including women and children.
In actuality, assault personnel estimated that there about 150
Khmer communists on Koh Tang at the time of the assault.

The

comptroller general's report stated that Pacific command and
local U.S. command officials felti the risks involved were
reasonable .

It was the report's opinion that no accurate

estimation of risks could be established with inadequate and
uncoordinated intelligence such as those observe<l during the
Mayaguez incident (U.S. Congress 1976).
It was not until two days later (May 17) that Marine
of icers in charge of the assault saw correct preassault
estimates of Khmer communist forces on Koh Tang, which
supports the critics response that a military assau 1t was
initiated too soon.
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. . . postponement of the operations would have
permitted additional time to plan the assault.
Because of the lack of t ime, no detailed
dperational plan for the Marine assault was
prepared. A formal assault plan would have
listed estimated enemy forces, and thus might
have alerted the local U.S. command to the fact
that Marine assault planners did not have the
accurate estimates of Cambodian strength.
A delay in the conduct of the rescue operation
would have permitted it to be made in an
entirely different manner (U .S. Congress 1976).
If more accurate information had been available, Marine sources
stated that it would have produced an assault action that was more
covert in nature, giving them an opportunity to limit risks and
safely rescue the crew.

The decision to proceed with the rescue

operation goes beyond poor decision-making.

The fact that poor

decision-making existed during the Mayaguez incident is
evident.

Why and how it was allowed to happen are the

significant questions here, and it is very clear that
external sources of stress were affecting the decisions made
thus producing the opportunity for the symptoms of groupthink
to become established.
Suppression of Personal Doubts
There are severa l factors involved in the Mayaguez
incident that are present to produce a suppression of doubts.
As we have discerned President Ford was concerned with his
elec t ion campaign and the problems surrounding his public
image.

Voters had not perceived the president as strong,
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take - char ge i ndi vidual who could handle the complexities of
the office .

It is a fac t that the decision made by the

president to proceed wi t h a military assault was heralded
by democrats and republicans in congress as a strong display
of leadership.

The question of the lack of decisive leadership

capabilities was no longer a campaign issue for conservative
epublicans to contend with when the incident was over and
overall approval was exhibite d.

The ending of the Mayaguez

incident was used as a media hype for the president, and
attributed to the strong posi tive attitude of the U.S.
actions that were taken .
To emphasize the att i tude of a successful operation a
statement was made for the re cord by Congressman Larry
McDonald of Georgia, who was a devout anticommunist.

It

stated:
I very much ap preci at e the opportunity present this
statement to the Committ€e on International Relations
relative to the Maya guez incident. While I understand
the s i ncere mot ives t hat compel some members of
Congress to want to re-examine the whole affair,
I wi ll repeat what I said before the House Armed
Services Comm i ttee - 'You only conduct an autopsy
when the pat i ent di e s!' So, in my view, it would
be more appropr i ate t o conduct an autopsy of our
Vietnam po li cy s ince in that case the patient
di ed . . . we need only to recall the Pueblo
i nc i de nt in whi ch the United States did not act
promp t ly and decisively. In this case we lost the
ship, lost one man, had three men wounded, one with
permanently disabling injuries, to say nothing of the
humili ating statement we had to sign in haggling for
t he re l ease of out men with a third rate power North Korea . . . Therefor€, in my view, the only
thing needed to write finis to this episo<l€ is for
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Congress to con grat ula te our Armed Services on the
dedicat i on, professiona l is m, and bravery that was
shown in the rescue of our ship and crew (U.S.
Congress 1976) .
·
The circumstances of the Puebl o incident were considered a
failure due to the fact the Nor th Koreans kept the crew for
almost a year, but it must also be remembered that the Pueblo
was an electronic surveillance sh ip and the Mayaguez was a
merchant ship.

Mortal fatalities i nvolved in the Pueblo

incident were limited to one compared with 15 killed and 3
missing in action in the Mayaguez i ncident.

Yet the Mayaguez

incident was considered a succes s where casualties during
helicopter and ground operat i on were much higher and included
50 wounded .

Clearly the success or failure was not determined

by the outcome but rather through the procedure.
In the Mayaguez incident the United States did not have
to go through any reference s involving humiliating negotiations
or wait an extended peri od of t ime for those negotiations to
take place like in the Pue blo incident.

A success through

procedure could not be estab lished with the United States in a
position contain in g no l everage.

Placing the United

St ~ tes

in

a positio n of weakness woul d reflect on our international
i mage .

Thus in t he Mayaguez incident the United States

chose to elim in ate the alte rnative and proceed almost directly
with th e mi l itary re scue operation.

Support here is

es tabli s hed with the fact that the military rescue operation
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had been in i tiated from Thailand territory by helicopter en
route toward t heir desti nation of Koh Tang island.

There

was approximatel y one hour head start between the start of
the U. S. rescue operation and the Cambodian announcement
that they were letting the crew go.

There is no record or

suggestion that the military operation be suspended or
postponed due to the informat ion - even with the rapid
forms of communication that di d exi st, making it possible for
Washington to initiate a quick hal t to the operation.
Decision -makers can uncons ci ou sly suppress their doubts
concerning the decisions be i ng made.

While Janis emphasizes

the unconscious suppression of doubts due to internal pressure
and structure of the dec isi on-ma king group, the transfer of
priority goals in the Mayaguez incident also transferred the
pressure to an external so urce, the maintenance and integrity
of the U. S. pos i t ion in the world.

With the transfer of

goals conscious doubt of t he initial goal concerning the
successful rescue of the sh ip and crew was over r idden and in
turn justified wi th i n t he decision-making group.

The

just i fication of do ub ts was present when the National Security
Co unc i l mo ved qui ck ly fr om a diplomatic solution of the
Mayag uez inc ident to a military one.

Even after tt:le military

ope r at i on was over the news media clearly reported the

res~ue

as a success and in the next sentence the media talked about
casu alties, inaccurate intelligence information and statements
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reporting the outcome , for success was not known prior to the
initiation of the military operation.

It was not until the

Air Force, in documenting the Mayaguez incident, publicly
announced that there were s i gnificant doubts that surrounded
the military rescue operatio n.
Also contributing to the suppression of personal doubts
was Kissinger's attitude at the time.

Clearly, Kissinger's

personal reaction to the fall of Cambodia and Vietnam to
communist influences contributed to his strong, if not
domineering, influence on the deci sion-making group and
contributing to internal psycholog ical stress.

In this

context, Kissinger was asked by a reporter on May 16, 1975,
to what extent the U.S . opera ti on played a part in the
restoration of American credib i l i ty or morale.

His reply was:

The thrust of our discuss i ons concerned the recovery
of the ship and the re scue of the men. If there were
any byproducts - that can be considered a bonus to
the operation , but it was not the principle impetus
behind the operation . We believed that we had to
draw a line aga i nst il l egal actions and, secondly
against situations whe re the United States might
be forced into a hum ili ating discussion about ransom
of innocent merchant seamen. If it had these
byproducts - I th i nk t o some extent it did have
this effect . But th is was not the pr imary motivation
beh i nd the actio n (U .S. Congress 1975).
On the same day Kis s inger wa s quo t ed in The New York Times
as sayin g t hat he believed t hat the demonstration of American
dete rmin ation in th e Mayaguez inci de nt would have at least
a mar ginal impact on the Russi ans showing them that we wer.

0
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not weak or indecisive.

U.S. actions, Kissinger felt, would

indicate to them not to take risks that could worsen the
international situation.

It is interesting to note, in

retrospect to Kissinger's answer on the Mayaguez incident,
that there is no account or threat of account concerning
ransom demands made by Cambodians for the Mayaguez and its
crew.

Also, in the comptroller general's report to congress,

it stated that the military assault on the Cambodian mainland
had no influence on the Cambodians returning the crew; the
captors were already in the process of releasing them.
Clearly these indicators establish that the United States was
more interested in projecting a message to the international
community rather than producing a situation where a maximization
of assurance would return the Mayaguez and its crew without
incident.
Personal attitudes can establish a source of stress for
the decision-making group as Janis (1982) describes producing
a time pressure on the group thus forming a basis to quickly
move from diplomatic measures to military ones in the
absence of substantial intelligence that would justify quick
action.

According to the groupthink hypothesis, once stress

is felt in the group effective decision-making will decrease
because of concurrence-seeking through group cohesion.
crisis decision-making when high stress is a factor, the
tolerance for ambiguity is reduced and as a result

During
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individuals are more wi l l ing to make decisions before adequate
information is ava i lable thus increasing the risks involved.
In the case of the Mayag uez incident ambiguity was present
in the press coverage but I do not believe that it existed
within the decision - mak i ng group - the pressure toward
exhibiting a national strength was paramount here.

Risks

were a significant factor i n t he Mayaguez incident with the
clearly inadequate and inaccura te intelligence information
exhibited .

The concern for r is ks can be overshadowed by the

combination of stress and uncertainty and thus lead people
to feel that "the worst wou l d be better than this" (Holsti
1978) .

This asserts that the pressure of external stress on

decision -makers was higher t han the threat of repercussions
that might be produced from r is ks in the decisions that were
made, thus becoming an intri cate factor when analyzing the
antecedent co ndi t i ons of groupthink.
As a res ul t of stre ss, the search for information and
options may be adverse ly affec ted in different ways.

According

to Jan i s, stress , as a contr ibuting factor of groupthink,
i nvolved pr i mar il y the stereotyping of the adversary (1982).
In t he Maya guez in cident the adversarial group
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described

as t he communist in f iltrators who had taken over Cambodia and
acted as pi rates in sei zing the ship.

References like these

were made by Ford and Kissinger in public statements and
interviews.

What is very

sign~fi c ant

here is the whole
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purpose of the rescue operation was based on the generalization
of the communist opposition involved.
I

Reference generalizations

surrounded the Mayaguez incident and led decision-makers to
further state that the purpose of the rescue operation was
broadly based, producing an even broader simplistic generalization
and establishing an ambiguous nature to the goals of the Mayaguez
incident for public consumption.

These generalized simplistic

terms did not allow for any alternative motives to be
established, especially with the information on the Cambodian
government's actions of the past several days prior to the
Mayaguez incident.

(Note that Tetlock's theory states that

public speeches involving groupthink observe simplistic terms
and have lower scores for cognitive complexity than for nongroupthink decisions.)
Conclusion
It can be stated unequivocally that the evidence
supporting the presence of groupthink during the Mayaguez
decision-making process is overwhelming, leading the
members of the group to proceed with a rescue attempt in
light of insufficient intelligence and feeling invulnerable
and superior to a small unorganized communist opposition.
It i s my assertion that the nature of the Mayaguez incident
itself perpetuated the development of groupthink and was
reinforced by external stress that was individually
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influe ncin g Pres ident Fo rd and Secretary of State Kissinger
in

ev~nts

leadi ng up t o t he time of the incident.

An examinat i on of events preceding the incident and
the incident itself is importa nt, and the relationship on
how they influence decis i on-makers is crucial in analyzing
the decision -making process .

During the Mayaguez incident

the influence exhibited by Ford and Kissinger on the
decision for a military rescue operation was directly
produced from the external pressure placed on them in the
situational context .

Even wi th recent failures in foreign

policy a conscious effort was not t aken during the Mayaguez
incident to decisively analyze t he decisions that were to be
made - but rather t he capture of the Mayaguez and crew was
used as a statement to countera ct t hose recent failures,
focusing the goal of re scu ing the ship and crew to one of
displaying U. S. s trength and intentions in Southeast Asia in
an aggressive ma nne r .
Central to group thin k is the cohesiveness of the group
toward concurrence - seek ing.

Due to the relatively short time

period cover in g t he Maya guez incident it is not possible to
asce r ta in i f t he cohesivenss of the group was strong enough
t o main ta in individual loyalty over an extended period of
t i me , as exhibited by Johnson's group during the 1ong
esc alation of the Vietnam war.

But as established earlier,

decision-making in the Ford administration was iRfluenced
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through different factions within it.
Mayag~ez

In respect to the

incident, it is possible to inductively piece together

that cohesion did exist during the decision-making process it was produced by way of default from the lack of contributing
debate by other members and domination of the decision-making
group exhibited by Ford and Kissinger.

Circumstances strongly

indicate that concurrence-seeking by way of the psychological
structure of the group was influenced strongly from Henry
Kissinger's position, in what Janis would describe as a
sycophantic attitude toward his insulation of influence
surrounding U.S. foreign policy.
Another development is observed here in groupthink.

Janis

observed the cohesiveness of the group being developed over a
long or extended period of time.

In the Mayaguez incident the

primary source of concurrence-seeking developed out of the
situational context.

Thus one of Janis' primary variables,

cohesiveness of the group members, can be applied to new
decision-making groups or ad-hoc group and not just those
groups where relationships have already been developed.
What is significant in terms of understanding the impact
of groupthink is the complacency displayed by the Dther group
members - especially with the knowledge of recent Cambodian
actions.

A logical conclusion in light of Dverwhelming

evidence of recent weeks prec€ding the capture of the Mayaguez
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would have bee n to include an option to wait and examine the
developments surro und in g t he i ncident.

No evidence exists

that the option to wa i t wa s even brought up in the National
Security Council (NSC) meetin g or the initiation of other
options of a l ess aggress i ve militaristic nature.
What the relatio nship of an tecedent conditions displayed
was that the decision to cons ciously proceed with a military
rescue operation created an external situational context
that influenced Ford and Kiss inge r as the primary decisionmakers.

The stress on these t wo men led the other members

of the group to be influenced by the psychological structure
of the group and promoted the characte r istic development of
groupthink.

Ev i dence here i s so strong because the decision

on how to respond to the capture was not made through debate
in the NSC, but throug h Ford and Kissinger's response to
external stress de veloping premature concurrence-seeking.
What prec i pitated t he development of groupthink was that
Ford and Kissinger's perc eptions of external stress on them
was greater tha n re percus s ions of their decisions created by
the incident .
by

In effec t, t he low level of th reat perceived

Ford and Ki ssin ge r f rom the Cambodians compared to the

exte rn al s tress of improving Ford's public image and the
Uni ted Stat es' position in the wor ld produced premature
concur rence-s eeking.

The devel-0pment of premature concurrence -

seeki ng then corresponds with Longley and Pruitt's (1980)
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evalu at i on toward a negat ive conno t ation.

The examination of

events , l ea ding up to a de ci s ion-making situation through the
antecedent co ndit i ons i n groupthink theory assists in explaining
the development of premature concu rrence-seeking, thus
describing the development of th e central variable of groupthink
through the situational context .
In a decision-making group where the situational context
is the main antecedent condition producing stress on the members
the intensity of an external stress affecting the
important.

gro~p

is very

The external stress du r i ng the Cuban Missile Crisis

parallels with those of the Mayag uez incident very closely.
Decision -makers felt the U. S. po si tion in the world could not
sustain the presence of Sov i et missiles so close to our shores
and President Ken nedy ' s pub li c i mage was also an issue at that
time.

As the nat i onal lea der , Kennedy could not subject the United

States to an even t t hat could endanger the national security and
subject his dec i s ion-mak in g abilities to criticism.

But as

recounted by individua l s i n th at decision-making group, the
external stress prod uce d by t he situation itself was intense.
The nature of the t hreat produced a situation where complacency
of gro up member s was not a problem, but rather the threat of
esca l at ion t o a nuclear confrontation stimulated debat€ and
noncurrence -see king.

In effect, as Janis {1982)

describe~

t he intens i t y of stress totally destroyed any feeling of
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unanimity or invulnerability that might have been felt by the
group .

Kennedy also took pre cautions against the psychological

structural faults that the group might have had by verbally
discouraging its development .
In the escalation of Vietnam (J anis 1982), external stress
was not initially present on the decision-making group as a
whole.

Personal stress was be i ng pl aced on Johnson during the

Vietnam war, since he was continua l ly being reminded that he
could not be the first U.S. president to lose a war.

But as

the time period extended over several years external stress
became present, affecting the group i n the form of public
opinion against U.S. involvement .

With the increasing unrest,

complacency of group members bega n eroding away, causing
individuals to question the decis i ons being made.

Defection

within the group was produc i ng commonplace and caused
individuals to l ose the i r position as group members.
Here we had a situat i on where the evolution of the
situational context produced external stress on the decisionmakers and slowly changed the initial psychological structural
faults of the group.

Co nsequ ent ly, wi t h t he in crease in the

external stress of publi c opinion, group members were 1eaving
and be in g re pl aced quie t ly .

But even with membership defection

t he co hes i on of the group was s t ill being maintained due to the
stre ngt h of t he psychological s t ructure.

While the

externa~

stres s was strong it was not intense enough to decrease the
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concurrence - seeking tende ncies of Johnson's group until early
in 1968 when the president gave the order to halt the bombing
of North Vietnam in a conc ilia t ory gesture toward peace.
Longley and Pruitt (1980) , i n their critique of groupthink,
state that they cannot substant i ate that stress can be a factor
in the development of groupth i nk . They cite the examples of
the Cuban Missile Crisis whe re there was extreme stress and
little existence of groupthink .

Al so, the Japanese attack of

Pearl Harbor, exhibiting the to t al lack of preparation and
anticipation by the United States , where groupthi nk symptoms
were present with a very low leve l of external stress of
antecedent conditions between structural faults of the
decision-making group and the situational context of the
environment.
Pearl Harbor was a cla ssi c example of a group structure
that reinforced itself towa rd a very strong feeling of
unanimity and invulnerabi li ty (Janis 1982).

Reassurance in

these areas produced low leve ls of stress on decision-makers
even though intel l igence i Aformation was indicating the
potential for an attack by t he Japanese.

Pearl Harbor was a

situat i on where t he antecedent conditions were limited to the
psychologi ca l st ruc t ure of the decision-making group.

Thus

exte rnal stres s in the situational context did not become a
vari abl e i n in f lu encing the development of groupthink.
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As just described , the l evel of stress placed on
decision -makers by the Cuban Missile Crisis actually
prevented the development of groupthink.

While Kennedy's

image and the United States' in fluential position in the world
were issues of external stress , the stress of nuclear
confrontation that the situationa l context produced was of a
nature that essentially made other sources of external stress
insignificant.

Hence, we had a si tua tion where the quality

of decision-making was sought after due to the extreme level
of external stress involved .
In the Mayaguez incident th e opposite was true; the lower
level of external stress that the situation produced intensified
the deficiencies of the group instead of correcting them.
These deficiencies were present in the group and especially
visible th ough the biased l eadership produced from premature
concurrence - seeking and the t otal lack of proper procedures
within the group toward qua lity decision-making.
Janis stated that even i f the policy makers had not
indulged in groupthink, t he policies followed might have been
the same because of pol i t i cal, idealogical or eco nomic values
held by dec i s i on- makers (1982 ).

Thus the elimination of

symptoms of groupthink does not mean the elimination of poor
deci sion-mak ing but would be a st ep toward quality decisionmak in g.
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Impro ving the qua l ity of decision-making by
eliminating certain sources of error that
prevent a group from achieving its goals can be
expected to have good social consequences for
policy -making gr oups that have good goals.
(Janis 1982)
The Mayaguez incident was an excellent example in showing the
relationship of the situationa l context as the main influence
toward groupthink .

In analyzi ng t he external stress we can

observe that the nature of the s tress affected the decisionmakers toward premature concurrence-seeking, reinforcing the
psychological structural fa ults of the group.

The awareness

of the relationship between antecedent conditions can assist
members of a group that the s i tua tional context can in-Oeed
influe ce the development of groupthink.
The outcome of the Mayag uez incident will most likely
maintain a positive connotat i on as a result of its general
approval but the decis ions that were made and the policy
produced had no part i n t his outcome.

The objectives of

rescuing the crew and s hi p were overshadowed by the objectives
of a national interest.

That interest, in turn, was influ€nced

by the personal att i t ude s of decision-makers.

In terms of

quality decis i on -mak in g t he outcome of the Mayaguez incident
cannot be interprete d as a success but as a failure that
could ha ve pote nti all y become a disaster.
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